Welcome to my Hell
Warning Death and Graphic Images
Almost everynight I dream the
world is going to end and I will have to care for
the sick and dieing, I see there faces
I feel there pain...
I don't wonder IF it will Happen
I wonder WHEN
I am Using this page to alert people
of the impending Doom of
Right Death's dispensary, by George John Pinwell, 1866. By
1866 most physicians and public health officials were convinced that
spread through the water supply.
Tryst Of Cure
Opening scene of blood born things
To cut the human infestation
true dreams of evolution streams
“Out Of Service”
But only for the duration
Lungs filled and swelled
Contaminated the well
Now so few walk vacant land
Obligated to tell
Of the Immune who walk hand in hand
Religion just a headstone in a world of crazed lunatics
Black smoke so thick
That it sticks to your throat
All the bodies from outbreak
and the bodies that float
goes to show
Clam voices go shrill
Realists born so solemn unsheltered
The weak were natures kill
not so far off from Skelter
Testing to find who posses a new gift
Gathering drifters, the self proclaimed best
anarchists law starts a new revolution
They Rise and they fall with Such Grave Solution
With the mark of the chosen
each other they’re driven
Even before the induction
They knew what they were
Killing in laughter
“Tryst of Cure”
Its not over yet!!
DOWNWIND REACH (km)
Rift Valley Fever
The Associated Press, "Proof Soviets Lied About US Warfare," New York
Times, November 16, 1998
WASHINGTON (AP) -- Cold War historians say they now know more about how
and why the Soviet Union and China fabricated a campaign in the 1950s to persuade the world that the United States used germ
and chemical warfare in the Korean War.
New documentary evidence from Moscow's still-secret archives suggests that
the charge was instigated by Chinese field advisers to the North Koreans. With many Koreans dying of cholera, the Chinese
advisers decided U.S. chemical and biological warfare must have been the cause.
To make the charge stick, the communists went to extraordinary measures
-- infecting North Koreans awaiting execution with plague and cholera so their bodies could be shown to outside investigators,
and forcing 25 captured American pilots to sign ``confessions.''
The undertaking, blessed by Josef Stalin and backed by Mao Tse-tung and
Chou En-lai, had some lingering success. The charge, denounced by U.S. officials from President Truman down, was repeated
in a 1989 book by two British journalists, Peter Williams and David Wallace, and again in a 1990 ceremony staged by Beijing.
In fact, ``neither Soviet officials nor Russian ones have to this day ever
stated that the Korean War biological warfare allegations were false,'' said biological warfare specialist Milton Leitenberg
of the University of Maryland.
Using newly accessible documents, Leitenberg and Cold War historian Kathryn
Weathersby put together a now-it-can-be-deduced study of the claim and the unpublicized decision to back off it. Their research
is to be published in the Bulletin of the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson Center, a government-sponsored
Leitenberg said the documents ``provide explicit and detailed evidence that
the charges were contrived and fraudulent.''
The new evidence came from the still-secret Presidential Archives in Moscow.
In January, a researcher was permitted to make notes -- but not photocopies -- from 12 documents. A Japanese newspaper, Sankei
Shimbun, wrote about the disclosures and made the notes available to scholars.
The charge was made in 1952, at the height of the Korean War and at a time
when North Korea confronted massive outbreaks of cholera and plague.
With an armistice only a few months away, a secret May 2, 1953 resolution
of the presidium of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. backed away from the charge, the documents show.
``The Soviet Government and the Central Committee of the CPSU (Communist
Party of the Soviet Union) were misled,'' said the resolution, which has never before been made public. ``The spread in the
press of information about the use by the Americans of bacteriological weapons in Korea was based on false information. The
accusations against the Americans were fictitious.''
The instigation for making the claim apparently came from Chinese field
commanders advising the North Koreans, the researchers say.
Soviet advisers already had raised the possibility with their Chinese counterparts.
The Chinese advisers, ``not wishing to be guilty of lack of vigilance ... nervously concluded that the American planes that
dominated the skies over North Korea and occasionally overflew Chinese territory were responsible for the outbreak of cholera,
plague and other infectious diseases in early 1952,'' Ms. Weathersby wrote.
They informed Beijing. Chou and Mao ordered a laboratory investigation,
but then denounced the United States, without waiting for results.
On Feb. 22, 1952, North Korea told the United Nations that U.S. aircraft
had dropped disease-bearing insects in seven raids. Two weeks later, Chou charged the United States had sent 448 aircraft
on 68 missions to spread plague, anthrax, cholera, encephalitis and meningitis.
Even after learning the truth, Ms. Weathersby wrote, Mao -- eager to maintain
revolutionary zeal at home -- ``was apparently unwilling to forfeit the domestic benefits of charging the United States with
using heinous weapons against Chinese soldiers, not to mention the propaganda value internationally.''
Without any field investigation on its own, an ``International Scientific
Commission'' led by British biochemist Joseph Needham, an avowed Marxist, issued a 669-page report accepting the Chinese claims
on the basis of testimony from witnesses. It was Needham, now dead, who repeated the charge in a 1990 ceremony where he was
honored by Beijing on his 90th birthday.
The Soviets went along, beating the drum on a worldwide stage. The United
States vigorously denied the charge, and, in the aftermath of Stalin's death in March 1953, the Soviets soon did an about-face.
The following is a summary of testimony presented by
Joshua Lederberg on August 24, 2001, to the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Joseph R. Biden, Chair. This testimony
is particularly pertinent in view of the recent terrorist attacks and subsequent episodes of anthrax.
Dr. Lederberg, a research geneticist, is professor and past president of
The Rockefeller University. He was a pioneer in the field of bacterial genetics with the discovery of genetic recombination
in bacteria. In 1958, at the age of 33, Dr. Lederberg received the Nobel Prize in Medicine for this work and subsequent research
on bacterial genetics. Since 1966, he has been concerned about the potential abuse of microbiology and has advised government
agencies about its control. In 1989 he was honored with the National Medal of Science by President George H.W. Bush, who cited
his role as consultant. Dr. Lederberg is cochair of a study on biological weapon threats and defensive measures tasked by
the Defense Science Board and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. He is also the editor of ABiological Weapons: Containing
the Threat,@ published by MIT Press in 1999.
I am honored to address the committee on a matter of transcendent importance
to U.S. security and global human welfare. I define biological warfare as use of agents of disease for hostile purposes. This
definition encompasses attacks on human health and survival and extends to plant and animal crops. Biological warfare was
the focus of billion-dollar investments by the United States and the former Soviet Union until President Nixon's unilateral
abjuration in 1969. This declaration was followed by the negotiation, ratification, and coming into force (in 1975) of the
Biological Weapons Convention, a categorical ban on the development, production, and use of biological weapons.
Biological weapons are characterized by low cost and ease of access; difficulty
of detection, even after use, until disease has advanced; unreliable but open-ended scale of predictable casualties; and clandestine
stockpiles and delivery systems. Per kilogram of weapon, the potential lives lost approach those of nuclear weapons, but less
costly and sophisticated technology are required.
Intelligence estimates indicate that up to a dozen countries may have developed
biological weapons. Considerable harm (on the scale of 1,000 casualties) could be inflicted by rank amateurs. Terrorist groups,
privately or state-sponsored, with funds up to $1 million, could mount massive attacks of 10 or 100 times that scale. For
each 1,000 persons on the casualty roster, 100,000 or 1,000,000 are at risk and in need of prophylactic attention, which in
turn necessitates a massive triage. Studies of hypothetical scenarios document the complexity of managing bioterrorist incidents
and the stress that control of such incidents would impose on civil order.
While powerful nations maintain a degree of equilibrium through mutual deterrence
and shared interests, less powerful elements may find in biological warfare opportunities to harm their enemies. Under current
levels of preparedness (e.g., physical facilities and organization and operational doctrines), biological warfare is probably
the most perplexing and gravest security challenge we face.
President Nixon's abjuration of biological warfare as a U.S. military weapon
in 1969 set in motion the most important diplomatic and legal steps towards its eradication globally, laying the groundwork
for the Biological Weapons Convention treaty. The treaty lacks robust verification mechanisms, mainly for reasons intrinsic
to the technology. However, verification is not the foundation of the U.S. stance; the United States has long since abandoned
the idea that it would respond in kind to such an attack. Were it not for the Biological Weapons Convention, a gradually escalating
technology race would have amplified even further this threat to human existence. The treaty does set a consensually agreed-upon
standard of behavior: it has become institutionalized into international law, and infractions open the door to enforcement.
Although further provisions for verification would do little to enhance
our knowledge of those infractions, they would nevertheless have important symbolic value in reaffirming international commitment
to the principles of the treaty. Creative leadership is needed to develop other ways to strengthen that reaffirmation. The
real problem with the Biological Weapons Convention is enforcement, not verification. We have all-but-certain knowledge that
Saddam Hussein has continued Iraq's biological weapons development program. To convince our allies, much less neutral nations
and potential adversaries, of what is at stake, we may have to elevate the priority we give to this threat. We must also become
more knowledgeable about the local political and cultural terrain and more ingenious in designing sanctions that will not
impose undue hardship on the Iraqi population. Our public diplomacy is predicated on the stated proposition that use of biological
weapons is an offense to civilization. This major accomplishment of the Biological Weapons Convention needs to be reaffirmed
both in the attention we give to our own defense and in our stern responses to substantial infractions from any quarter.
Unlike the aftermath of nuclear or high-explosive bombardment, attack with
biological weapons is amenable to interventions for some hours or days after the event, depending on the agent used. With
the most publicized agent, anthrax, administration of appropriate antibiotics can protect the majority of those exposed. The
other side of the coin is recognizing the syndrome within hours of the earliest symptoms. Biosensors are being developed to
confirm suspicions of anthrax. We will have to rely on early diagnosis of the first human (or animal) cases to provide the
basis for focusing those sensors. Because a wide list of diseases must be considered, this surveillance entails reinvigorating
our overall public health infrastructure. In contrast to the explosive rise of health-care expenditures, public health funding
has been allowed to languish, boosted only very recently by public arousal about emerging infections and bioterrorism. That
boost entails personnel and organizational structures, but improvement also depends on funding for new as well as established
In addition to diagnostic capability, we need organizational and operational
doctrines that can confront unprecedented emergencies, we need trained personnel on call, and we need physical facilities
for isolation, decontamination, and care. We also need stockpiles of antibiotics and vaccines appropriate to the risk, preceded
by careful analysis of what kinds and how much. We need research on treatment methods (e.g., how should inhalational anthrax
be managed with possibly limited supplies of antibiotics). Still more fundamental, research could give us sharper tools for
diagnosis and more usable ranges of antibacterial and antiviral remedies.
Organizing the government to deal with mass contingencies
is a goal that is vexing and still poorly addressed. It entails coordination of local, state, and federal assets and jurisdictions
and the intersection of law enforcement, national security, and public health. A time of crisis is not ideal for debates over
responsibility, authority, and funding.
Our main bulwark against direct large-scale attack is the combination of
civic harmony and firm retaliation. Better intelligence is key to retaliation, apprehension, and penal containment and sanctions.
This territory is technically unfamiliar to most of the intelligence community, which has taken many positive steps but has
a long way to go. Resources for managing biological threats are fewer than those allocated to other, more familiar threats.
I have already alluded to public diplomacy (starting with firm conviction
at home) about the level of priority to be given to the biological weapons threat if a successful attack is to be averted.
A dilemma is how to study the threats of biowarfare in detail and develop vaccines and other countermeasures, while maintaining
the policy of abhorrence at the idea of using disease as a weapon. The central premise of the Biological Weapons Convention
is that infectious disease is the common enemy of all humans and that joining with that enemy is an act of treason against
humanity. This premise clearly inspired adherence to the Convention, even by countries that might otherwise exploit biological
weapons to level the playing field against a superpower. Having set aside biological weapons as of small advantage to U.S.
military power, we are fortunate that we share the treaty's interests and conclusions. They can only be strengthened if we
internalize them and participate ever more fully in global campaigns for health. Current levels of funding for AIDS, malaria,
and tuberculosis are small but are certainly steps in the right direction. We should assume leadership among nations cooperating
with the World Health Organization to bolster global systems of surveillance and outbreak investigation of diseases that could
threaten us all.